“To my understanding, the reason why most of the Iraqis riot and hold anti-American demonstrations…”
We’re also frequently shooting civilians and other bystanders in accidents, cases of mistaken identity, and cases of itchy trigger fingers. It’s hard to figure out how many it adds up to, exactly, because the media aren’t exactly encouraged to report on these things (just like they’re not reporting on the wounded American troops), but it’s clearly happening often enough to cause concern. Taken in tandem with the unprepared American management, the use of old Ba’athist apparatchiks, the detention camps, and all that, the Iraqis might have cause to be angry at that. Recently someone came up with the idea of destroying the property of farmers (e.g. bulldozing groves of trees) as some kind of collective punishment. Regardless of whether or not that was justified, those are exactly the kinds of things that make people, even people who cheered when we deposed Hussein, angry at us now.
“Most Iraqis are upset because America can’t seem to get the security situation under control and the country back up and running…”
If anything, the security situation has been getting more out of hand. We’ve had more daily attacks on the troops, and just recently, the insurgents blew up the hotel where Paul Wolfowitz was staying, destroyed one of our supposedly invincible Abrams tanks, and killed 15 GIs with one shot, all apparently just to show that they could. There was also a recent spate of car bombings in Baghdad, which should be the one single place in Iraq that we should be able to keep stable. Those are all events of the past couple of weeks.
“It is too complex a situation to create a specific timetable.”
Even a non-specific timetable or a tentative timetable, and a tentative assessment of costs, is better than no timetable and no assessment and constant evasion of any questions in that direction, which is what we have now.
“Compare South Korea to North Korea to see what the difference would be between an Iraq we rebuild, and an Iraq we don’t.”
Our presence in both Korea and Japan was seen by both the Koreans and Japanese as having far more legitimacy than our presence in Iraq from the point of view of the Iraqis, which was an important reason why we could rebuild them in the first place.
Keep in mind that I’m not really disagreeing with the principle of your post. I agree that it would be better, abstractly speaking, if we could turn Iraq into a democracy and administer it fairly while we’re there, than it would be if we were to leave. But I don’t think the administration is well-equipped to do that, understands how to do that, or is even very interested in working to establish peace as opposed to making more war and advancing the radical agenda of the neoconservatives. The magnitude of our lack of preparedness in Iraq, itself a result of that very lack of interest, has sapped the momentum of that agenda at least for the time being, but it doesn’t mean that its proponents aren’t just as important as before and still actively pushing it. It is just that that might turn this situation into a choice between leaving now while a theocracy appears in Iraq, or leaving later while a theocracy appears in Iraq.